This essay argues for consideration of political opportunity costs in the criteria used to evaluate climate policy instruments. Law and policy debates typically evaluate policy instruments by their expected performance after adoption, tacitly excluding consideration of the timing of adoption. Under this standard, a comprehensive carbon pricing instrument, either in the form of a cap and trade program or a carbon tax, has emerged as the preferred approach. Yet, by excluding the political process from consideration, this standard obscures the effects of political feasibility on the timing of adoption. For many problems, the advantages of an optimal policy outweigh the advantages of a sub-optimal policy that will require less time and effort to adopt. The climate problem is different: the irreversibility of climate change, the possibility of tipping points in the climate system, and lag times in infrastructure investments combine to impose large costs on delay. Excluding political opportunity costs from instrument evaluation leads to a preference for slow, comprehensive remedies. The casualties in this process are incremental instruments that could buy time, facilitate the adoption of additional instruments, or complement existing instruments. This Essay proposes explicit consideration of political opportunity costs in evaluating climate policy instruments and applies this approach to several leading climate policies.
Often, the most important issues in scholarly and policy debates receive insufficient attention because they fall between disciplinary lines. Climate instrument choice-whether involving cap and trade programs, emissions taxes, or clean-energy research and developmentis perhaps the most tragic example of this phenomenon. Political opportunity costs fall outside the expertise of many legal scholars and economists who develop and evaluate climate mitigation instruments. By political opportunity costs, we mean both the effects of overcoming political barriers on the timing of adoption of the selected policy and the unrealized emissions reductions other policies could have achieved in the interim. Until the last several years, scholarship in law and economics has noted the importance of political feasibility but has given limited attention to political opportunity costs when evaluating the optimality of climate instruments. 2 We argue that the failure to account for political opportunity costs has delayed the development of incremental climate mitigation instruments without increasing the prospects for adoption of more comprehensive solutions. We also argue that several structural aspects of the climate threat-its irreversibility, its potential to produce globally catastrophic consequences, the prospect for unforeseen consequences due to tipping points and nonlinear cascade effects, and the long lag between enacting a policy and affecting emissions and global temperatures-require new approaches that account for political feasibility, and we identify emerging examples of these new approaches.
Three aspects of instrument choice are easily conflated but are particularly important for climate policy: the magnitude of the 1 TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL TRENDS, NO. 30, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERV., WAR DEP 'T 38 (1943) . This statement has been attributed to General George S. Patton and has been quoted or paraphrased in a variety of forms and sources. 2 See discussion infra notes 59-62. But see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUBL. ADMIN. REV. 79, 84 (1959) (observing that the cost of resolving disagreements can be reduced by pursuing an incremental approach in which optimality is evaluated by ad hoc criteria that arise in the process of implementation, rather than by pre-defined objectives).
emissions reductions, the timing of the reductions, and the comprehensiveness of the policies designed to achieve the reductions. Many scholars and policymakers agree that large emissions reductions will be required to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, but important differences of opinion emerge over the timing of reductions. For many social problems, the timing of adopting a legal or policy response has limited significance. For issues such as health care, labor or immigration reform, problems may get worse at the national level and may be irreversible for any one individual, but few tipping points exist that will lead to irreversible harms in the event of delay at the national or international level.
3 For these types of problems, large changes in behavior may be required by the targets of the regulatory instrument, but the appropriate decision heuristic for instrument choice may downplay the importance of time of adoption. Similarly, incremental or partial near-term improvements may be valuable but are not essential.
Problems that are important but reversible when action is ultimately taken dominate the law and policy world. 4 The common structure of these problems suggests the need for large changes in behavior but not for urgent adoption. This structure also encourages the use of an implicit decision heuristic that only considers comprehensive policies, even if they delay action as compared to incremental policies. 5 This "panacea bias" supports and is supported by disciplinary boundaries that exclude political feasibility from consideration. 6 The exclusion of political feasibility concerns poses only a minor problem if delays are not important for assessing the performance of policy instruments. Yet, political feasibility is a vital concern if delay impacts those assessments. In addition, the panacea bias induces analysts to underestimate the difficulty of adopting comprehensive policies and to overestimate the 5 As Michael Levi points out, the climate policy debate typically asks whether a particular instrument will "solve" the climate problem. Michael Levi NOWHERE (2010) . 6 We thank David Krantz for suggesting the term "panacea bias." [Vol. 32:1 extent to which incremental policies will undermine support for comprehensive policies. For climate change, time is of the essence. Not only must a climate instrument achieve large overall emissions reductions, it must begin to do so quickly. A recent study analyzed the effects of four types of uncertainty (geophysical, technological, social, and political) on the costs associated with achieving various temperature targets and concluded that "political choices that delay mitigation have the largest effect on the cost-risk distribution, followed by geophysical uncertainties, social factors influencing future energy demand, and, lastly [,] technological uncertainties surrounding the availability of greenhouse gas mitigation options." 7 Other research suggests that due to the delays in adopting an emissions reductions scheme over the last eight years, a daunting level of emissions reductions is now necessary.
8
Delay affects both the magnitude of the emissions reductions that must be achieved and the costs of achieving reductions. Economist William Nordhaus has estimated that the cost of a fifty-year delay in reducing CO 2 emissions is $4.1 trillion, 9 and even this figure may be significantly understated.
10
The importance of delay is not simply a matter of policy preference for precaution regarding environmental or other social risks. Several distinctive properties of climate change aggravate the costs of delay as compared to many other problems. Most air pollutants have short lifetimes and dissipate quickly once emissions are curtailed, but carbon dioxide and many other greenhouse gases have long lifetimes, making climate change irreversible for thousands of years.
11 Thus, intensified action in the future may not compensate for present delay. Even after greenhouse gas emissions cease, impacts of climate change will worsen for decades or centuries and then persist for millennia, so adjusting regulatory responses on the basis of observed impacts is not feasible. Lock-in effects of investments in energy and transportation lead to significant lags between new policies and their impacts on emissions.
13
Unlikely but distressing outcomes are more central to policy analysis for climate change than for most hazards. 14 The possibility of unknown thresholds for runaway damage or runaway warming magnifies concerns about irreversibility and catastrophe. 15 The law and policy literature on climate instrument selection has focused on the processes for policy development 16 and on how various instruments will perform if adopted. 17 The political feasibility of adopting these instruments can be equally important. Yet, after two decades of political resistance to major climate mitigation measures, the role of political feasibility in instrument choice and the implications of delay are only now beginning to be addressed. 18 Until recently, the debate has been divided between those advocating comprehensive and efficient but politically difficult remedies that have little prospect of being adopted in time, 19 and those who advocate remedies that can be 13 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 110 (stating that "long-term capital investments . . . can lock in emissions-intensive technologies"). 14 adopted in the near term but that will not achieve sufficient emissions reductions. 20 The former remedies address the magnitude issues but not the timing, and the latter address the timing issues but not the magnitude. 21 The structure of the climate problem requires attention to both.
We argue for an explicit debate about the appropriate decision heuristic for climate change and the adoption of climate instruments that are optimal when delay and other political opportunity costs are considered. Gersen and Posner have noted that "the timing of a law can be just as important as its content."
22 Instrument selection should balance the costs of policymaking necessary to produce a superior instrument (including the opportunity costs of delays) against the instrument's benefits relative to sub-optimal ones. 23 Few analyses of instrument selection for environmental policy explicitly consider the political costs of policymaking, however, or their effects on the timing of emissions reductions. 24 We demonstrate that when the analysis accounts for both the timing and the magnitude of the reductions, the limitations of comprehensive measures that achieve large reductions too late and incremental measures that achieve prompt but small emissions reductions become clear. We discuss newly emerging lines of legal and policy scholarship that have begun to account for political feasibility, and we identify opposition to new taxes) may explain many economists' focus on cap and trade programs rather than carbon taxes, despite the consensus that emissions taxes have lower deadweight loss. But, by now it is clear that even cap and trade faces significant opposition. 20 viable new options. 25 We also propose a new approach to assessing policy instruments that explicitly weighs the political obstacles and their associated opportunity costs against the instruments' projected performance once adopted.
Our goal is not to provide the final word on the appropriate standard for reviewing climate instruments but to provoke the interdisciplinary dialogue necessary to generate a more useful standard. We expect that a comprehensive policy or assembly of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will ultimately be necessary to avoid unacceptable risks but that such a policy will not materialize soon. In the meantime, our approach can identify effective bridging measures without obstructing more complete policy efforts.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CLIMATE PROBLEM
The difficult collective action problems posed by climate change at the global, national, and local levels have been identified by scholars in numerous fields. 26 The magnitude of the emissions reductions necessary to substantially reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change has been apparent for some time, but the significance of delay has received much less attention until recently. We begin by examining the aspects of the climate problem that make timing a critical consideration and then turn to the implications for instrument choice.
Much climate policy discussion has focused on a target of preventing the average global temperature from rising more than 2°C above preindustrial levels. This target was reiterated during the 2010 Cancun meeting of the Conference of Parties as the maximum temperature rise consistent with satisfying the UNFCC mandate to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."
27 Although the 2°C target has been the subject of legitimate criticism-it is necessarily 25 See discussion infra notes 80-99. 26 arbitrary and can become a distraction in policy debates-it does convey an important concept. The 2°C target is similar to the red line on a car's tachometer: it is not certain that the engine will fail if the tachometer goes above the red line, and it is also possible for the engine to fail when the tachometer is below the red line, but the red line represents a threshold above which the probability of engine failure rises dramatically.
Scientists cannot be certain that no harm will occur if warming remains below 2°C or that catastrophic consequences will occur if temperatures cross the threshold; rather, it represents a level above which risk rises rapidly.
28 Considerable scientific uncertainty exists about the exact relationship between temperature and the probability and severity of climatic damage, but it is widely accepted that the farther temperatures rise above 2°C, the greater the probability of severe damage. 29 Although there is nothing scientifically unique about 2°C, it represents a normative political judgment of the temperature above which the probability of severe consequences begins to rise unacceptably quickly. 30 Considerable disagreement exists among scientists over how feasible it is to meet the 2°C target. Some studies conclude that it may be impossible to cut emissions quickly enough to meet the target. 31 Others find the target to be achievable, but only if 28 By "risk" due to climate change, we mean both the probability and the severity of possible damage. Above 2°C, rising risk refers both to the rising probability of a certain severity damage and also the rising severity of damage that occurs with any degree of probability, such as five percent. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 32 (Nat'l Acad. Press 1989) (explaining that "the concept of risk further quantifies hazards by attaching the probability of being realized to each level of potential harm"). 29 See (2010) (noting that the 2°C target emerged more "from a set of heuristics" as part of policy development than from rigorous scientific criteria and that it "may represent a boundary beyond which" major risks increase rapidly); Michael Oppenheimer, Defining Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference: The Role of Science, the Limits of Science, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1399, 1405-06 (2005) (describing the scientific uncertainty that would allow "dangerous anthropogenic interference" to be defined as somewhere in the range of 1-4°C and noting the political process in which "dangerous temperatures . . . ostensibly have been derived within a framework based on natural science but with the addition of a precautionary criterion for managing risk and uncertainty," but that "what is regarded as 'dangerous' by policymakers and the lay public may well evolve over time"). 31 Detlef P. many nations take immediate and drastic action to cut emissions. 32 One recent study concluded that without rapid emissions cuts, "the 2°C target will become unachievable after 2027, and the 2.5°C target will become unreachable after 2040." 33 Confronting the growing likelihood of exceeding the 2°C target, scientists have begun to assess the dangers of 3°C or 4°C warminglevels we are likely to experience before 2100 if emissions continue to grow at their present trajectories 34 -and the consequences appear dire. 35 Observing that 4°C would be warmer than today by almost as much as today is warmer than the last ice age, the World Bank has warned that such temperatures would produce "unprecedented heat waves, severe drought, and major floods in many regions, with serious impacts on human systems, ecosystems, and associated services." 36 (2012) (noting that future action to reduce emissions "cannot fully compensate for the higher short-term emissions" so "significant emission reductions are required" in the next decade "if one aims to achieve the 2°C target with medium or likely probability"). 33 38 In addition, unexpected tipping points could produce results much worse than those anticipated by this and other reports. 39 Thus, if keeping warming below 2°C becomes impossible, maintaining a level below 3°C or 4°C becomes a challenge with increasingly dire stakes the longer we delay action.
Disciplinary norms among natural and social scientists discourage use of language that could be seen as hyperbolic or emotional. 40 Perhaps as a result, national and international policymaking exhibit little sense of urgency or priority. Yet, even paranoids have enemies.
41 Expert assessments overwhelmingly agree that anthropogenic climate change is a real and serious threat. 42 More than three decades after the Charney Report warned that "a wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late,"
43 there is growing recognition that comprehensive national measures in the United States and many other countries will not be adopted in time. 44 The international picture is similarly bleak. The 17th session of the Conference of Parties ("COP17") meeting in Durban yielded only a 37 Id. at xv. 38 Id. at xv-xvii, 5-7. 39 Id. at xvii-xviii (noting that "[a]s global warming approaches and exceeds 2°C, the risk of crossing thresholds of nonlinear tipping elements in the Earth system, with abrupt climate change impacts . . . increases [and] non-binding agreement to work toward a new treaty that would begin reducing emissions by 2020, 45 and even if these efforts succeed, such a treaty will take years to produce substantial reductions. Several features of the climate change problem make timing a critical part of instrument selection: the irreversibility of climate change, the possibility of tipping points in the climate system, cascade effects in both natural systems and socioeconomic institutions, and lag times in infrastructure investments.
Irreversibility. Carbon dioxide and many other greenhouse gases have very long lifetimes, so concentrations will remain high for thousands or even tens of thousands of years after emissions cease. 46 Adjusting regulatory responses on the basis of observed impacts is not feasible because even after emissions cease, temperatures and climatic impacts (e.g. sea-level rise and mega-droughts) will intensify for decades or centuries and persist for millennia. 47 Unlikely but dangerous outcomes are more central to policy analysis for climate change than for most hazards.
48
Tipping Points. The climate system may contain thresholds above which runaway damage may occur, such as unstoppable ice-sheet collapse or runaway warming due to emissions of methane from thawing tundra and the sea floor. 49 The World Bank notes that tipping points may occur in both the natural climate system and in human institutions, which may weaken or collapse in the face of climatic stresses. 50 If such tipping points exist, it would be difficult to detect them until they are crossed, and by then it would likely be too late to reverse course and avoid the consequences.
Cascade Effects. Climate impact assessments produce lists of possible consequences of climate change but do not generally consider 45 he greatest threats are tipping the Arctic sea-ice and the Greenland ice sheet, and at least five other elements could surprise us by exhibiting a nearby tipping point"); Wieczorek et al., supra note 15, at 1266 (reporting a possible tipping point in which rising temperatures could cause "a potentially catastrophic explosive release of peatland soil carbon into the atmosphere"); WORLD BANK, supra note 35, at xvi (noting that tipping points become increasingly likely as temperatures approach 4°C).
50 WORLD BANK, supra note 35, at xvii. [Vol. 32:1 how these events may interact nonlinearly to produce impacts beyond the sum of the individual effects. The recent World Bank report suggests that drought and crop failures might combine to reduce the work capacity of the population, significantly affecting gross domestic product and thereby weakening or destroying institutions that might be expected to respond to the water and crop stresses. 51 Although reductions in gross domestic product would also likely decrease carbon emissions, lag times in climate effects from emissions would likely result in reductions that are too late to forestall major changes in the climate. The World Bank report also notes that rising sea levels may induce mass migration sufficient to destabilize political and economic systems.
52
Lag Times. Lock-in effects of investments in energy and transportation result in significant lags between new policies and their impacts on emissions. 53 Even if an overnight transformation of the political landscape produced widespread support for a comprehensive cap and trade system, a carbon tax, or a massive program for clean energy innovation and adoption, it would take years to assemble coalitions, pass laws, and implement the new measures-and years more to replace existing energy and transportation infrastructure.
Despite these dangers arising from delay, international and domestic climate policy processes are moving slowly, if at all. At the 2012 Doha meeting, the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change noted "with grave concern[,] the significant gap" between the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions pledged by the parties and the reductions necessary to limit global warming to no more than 2°C. 54 Indeed, 2011 emissions of greenhouse gases were the highest levels recorded, until 2012 levels eclipsed them. 55 The global consensus that dangerous climate change can only be avoided with 51 Id. at xvii; see also prompt and large emissions reductions conflicts with the minimal agreements to make such cuts.
Some policy proposals have emphasized the political infeasibility of comprehensive remedies and have largely focused on technology promotion. Although these proposals legitimately account for the current political climate, they offer the prospect for emissions reductions that fall far short of what is widely accepted as necessary to forestall dangerous climate change. 56 Discussing proposals to reform Congress, Mann and Orenstein compare such policies to preparing for a tsunami by building a thin line of sandbags while telling critics that at least the sandbags are better than nothing. 57 Policy proposals for comprehensive carbon pricing instruments begin with the valid position that policy measures must match the scale of the hazards that they address. But, the focus on large-scale, comprehensive measures neglects the opportunity costs imposed by political obstacles and the danger that the optimal instrument may fail to meet its objectives due to delayed implementation. Moreover, by focusing on monolithic solutions, this approach neglects the possibility that an incremental strategy with smaller political opportunity costs might produce large results quickly and buy time to overcome the political obstacles to adopting more effective and, possibly, more comprehensive remedies. 58 We call this a "panacea bias"-an asymmetric credulity regarding the potential net benefits of comprehensive versus incremental solutions. In Part III, we outline an approach to climate instrument choice that accounts for the timing and magnitude of emissions reductions in the choice between incremental and comprehensive policies.
III. PRAGMATIC INSTRUMENT EVALUATION FOR CLIMATE POLICY
We argue that climate instrument choice should not begin with a narrow concept of optimality and proceed to an application of that standard to select among climate instruments. Instead, the debate should begin one step earlier in the decision-making process-it should start with the appropriate methods for evaluating and choosing instruments. Regardless of the selected approach to evaluating climate policy 56 See, e.g., Levi, supra note 5, at 70; PIELKE JR., supra note 20, at 224; PRINS ET AL., supra note 20, at 34.
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORENSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 160 (2012).
58 Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 520 (1979) (noting that "a fast-moving sequence of small changes can more speedily accomplish a drastic alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent major policy change").
instruments, the analysis should account not only for the magnitude and cost of the emissions reductions that the instruments could achieve, but also for the opportunity costs of the time and effort required to enact them. Whether this approach is framed as an expanded form of optimality or as an alternative to optimality, such as satisficing (searching for any option that is "good enough" instead of comparing all possible options to determine the best), it replaces a narrow analytical focus with a broadly pragmatic perspective that reflects the unusual structure of the climate problem. 59 Policies are often judged in perfectionist terms: second or third-best policies are rejected in favor of first-best policies. Proponents of costbenefit analysis ("CBA") advocate choosing policies that will maximize net-benefit to society. 60 CBA reminds us that focusing too narrowly on reducing certain risks can blind us to others. 61 Bounded rationality suggests that there are costs to evaluating choices, and the time and effort required to determine the very best choice may cost more than the difference in value between the best option and a good-enough option. 62 Similarly, focusing too narrowly on the impact that a policy might have once it is implemented can blind us to the opportunity costs imposed by the political and technical obstacles to adoption and implementation.
63

A. A New Standard
A next-best policy that can be quickly enacted and executed may do more good than a first-best one that is long delayed. But, if the best policy nevertheless has the prospect of performing significantly better than next-best policies, enacting a next-best policy today should not preclude pursuing the longer project of eventually complementing or replacing it with the very best one. Conversely, if an inferior policy can 59 Herbert A. Simon 63 Rogelj et al., supra note 7, at 79-83 (finding that a twenty year delay in action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would dramatically increase the cost of mitigation and, "if mitigation action is delayed, simply spending more money on the problem in the future will not increase this probability [of successfully keeping warming below 2°C]").
be enacted immediately but has a significant prospect of eroding support for a far superior policy in the longer term, it may be worth opposing the former in favor of the latter, despite the delay. In short, one of the standards for evaluating next-best policies should be spillover effects on the likelihood of adopting first-best policies.
Comprehensive policies are often perceived to be superior (first-best) when compared to combinations of smaller, more focused (next-best) policies, but this perception may be wrong. More than three decades ago, Socolow observed that addressing a multifaceted environmental problem with multiple single-purpose measures may offer more flexibility and performance than a comprehensive multi-purpose project. 64 Rather than looking for a single unified policy to address a difficult problem, such as climate change, it may be more efficient to pursue a battery of "good enough" measures whose collective impact would meaningfully address the problem. This approach resembles the satisficing heuristic commonly applied to problems of bounded rationality, but whereas satisficing chooses the first good-enough candidate from a set of mutually exclusive options, 65 a standard of review that considers the timing of implementation will often recommend pursuing multiple good-enough policies from a set of compatible options.
This approach resembles proposals to address large environmental problems with "modular" approaches that "whittle away" at the problem through the coordinated actions of multiple agencies. 66 However, instead of focusing on agency coordination, we focus here on reducing obstacles to rapidly adopting public and private measures. The Stabilization Wedge concept builds on this point: it breaks the difficult problem of halting the growth of greenhouse gas emissions into a collection of fifteen separate policy "wedges," each of which reduces the rate of growth slightly using available technology, and which combine to produce a large collective impact. 67 Controversy around the stabilization wedge idea has focused on questions of whether enough wedges have been identified to compensate for business-as-usual growth of greenhouse gas emissions over 50 years. 68 But, these criticisms miss a larger point: even if the total emissions reduction from a set of wedges is inadequate to account for all business-as-usual emissions growth over a given period, they still can significantly reduce emissions growth over that time and can thus buy time to develop the revolutionary energy technology that both the advocates and the critics of wedges agree will ultimately be necessary. 69 For the political perfectionist, we note that comprehensive policies may, by dint of their sheer size and complexity, be much less popular than each of their parts: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as Obamacare) is very unpopular with the public, even though most of its major provisions are popular when considered separately. 70 In the climate policy arena, numerous proposals have attempted to address problems of perfectionism, including Pacala and Socolow's sustainability wedges, 71 Ostrom's polycentric governance, 72 Victor's international clubs, 73 Keohane's and Victor's regime complexes,
One aspect of the panacea bias problem is the supposition that if a policy does not address international coordination, it is futile. This approach has contributed to the paralysis of U.S. and international climate policy. 77 Victor proposes cooperation among small clubs of nations as a superior approach to international coordination as it currently functions through the UNFCCC process. 78 At the other end of the spectrum, California's new cap and trade program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and other state and local initiatives demonstrate the political feasibility of sub-national action.
79 Although Victor's "clubs" proposal and other new international strategies are promising, we also argue that as the U.S. has both the second-largest national greenhouse gases emissions and one of the greatest per-capita emissions levels, it can play an important role as a unilateral actor. Our goal is to facilitate a more effective process for developing domestic climate policy.
B. Framework for Considering Political Opportunity Costs
We now step back to consider how best to account for political opportunity costs in the evaluation and selection of climate policy instruments. Morgan et al. wrote that global climate change is sufficiently different from other policy problems that "conventional tools of policy analysis, routinely applied, can lead to wrong or silly answers." 80 A large literature addresses planning and policy analysis for problems poorly suited for conventional rational utility maximization approaches 81 and considers alternatives to unified comprehensive solutions. 82 Until recently, however, the policy and scholarly debate has continued to focus on comprehensive optimal solutions. Climate change has been widely described as a wicked, or even "super wicked" problem for policymaking. 83 Wicked problems are a class of intractable policy and planning problems, characterized by, among other factors, great uncertainties that limit predictive power; interconnectivity among their pieces, which prevents deconstructing a large problem into many smaller, more tractable ones; an enormous set of possible policy responses; and conflicts among stakeholders as to the appropriate policy goals. 84 Wicked problems cannot be solved optimally, both because criteria for judging solutions are subjective and disputed and because the complexity of the problem prevents accurately predicting how different measures will perform. We suggest drawing on the extant literature on both wicked problems and bounded rationality to develop a bi-focal standard of review that explicitly considers short-term factors, such as political feasibility and timing, without losing sight of long-term factors, including the magnitude of the hazard and the ultimate objective of managing that hazard.
Standard policy analysis evaluates policy instruments by considering the costs and benefits of executing the instrument and then applies a decision rule, such as maximizing the net benefit. We propose to extend this evaluation by explicitly considering the opportunity costs imposed by the political process for enacting and implementing the instrument. For climate policy, this can be integrated into existing frameworks for evaluating the costs and benefits of mitigation and adaptation policies. Alternatively, for those concerned about the inability of cost-benefit analysis to account for the structure of the climate change problem, it can be used as part of another structured decision-making process that does not quantify costs and benefits.
For mitigation policies, to the extent that we can predict "business-asusual" emissions trajectories in the absence of new regulations, it is straightforward to compute how delays will affect the schedule of emissions reductions necessary to hit a target concentration of greenhouse gases and how great a delay will put a given target out of reach. 85 Computing the effect of delays, however, is complicated by 82 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 66, at 836-37; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 66, at 60-62, 98-109; Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, supra note 72, at 3-4; Ostrom, Nested, supra note 44, at 353-54. 83 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 26, at 1159. 84 Id. (defining wicked problems) ; see also Rittel, supra note 81, at 160-69 (introducing the concept of wicked problems). 85 See Stocker, supra note 8, at 281; NAT'L ACAD. SCI., supra note 8, at 32-33, 38; Rogelj et al., supra note 43, at 406 (noting that in predicting future emissions, "the spread across models uncertainties. Examples include the uncertainties associated with estimating the business-as-usual trajectory (1990 estimates completely missed the rapid growth of China's emissions, and a major effort was necessary to construct new "Representative Concentration Pathways" to allow models to account for the unanticipated acceleration of emissions), establishing the climate sensitivity parameter that connects greenhouse gas concentrations to temperature rise, and determining what temperature rise a policy should set as a target to avoid tipping points or catastrophic damage while at the same time keeping the costs of achieving that target commensurate with its benefits.
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For adaptation policies, scientists are still uncertain about many impacts of climate change over the coming century, but they understand factors such as sea level rise well enough to predict what types of adaptation may be necessary under different emissions scenarios. Information is also available about the costs of delaying the adoption of adaptation instruments, such as building enhanced water infrastructure for regions likely to face drought or revising land-use regulations for coastal communities facing sea-level rise.
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Although it may be possible to estimate the costs and benefits of delaying policy adoption, it is likely infeasible to prepare valuable quantitative estimates for the amount of time necessary to win support for controversial policies. Uncertainty about this critical piece of instrument evaluation means that attempts to optimize a climate policy will fail. 88 We face a problem closely related to bounded rationality. Bounded rationality occurs when an optimal decision exists but cannot can be quite significant"); Rogelj, supra note 7, at 80-81 (observing that "social developments influencing energy demand . . . are . . . important" sources of uncertainty in forecasting businessas-usual emissions). 86 See, e.g., PIELKE, supra note 20, at 12-15, 157-58 (asserting that these uncertainties make targets futile and counterproductive for policy design). 87 88 See, e.g., Rogelj, supra note 7, at 80, 81 (finding that "the dominant [uncertainty] is politics" because "the effect of global mitigation action delayed by two decades is much more pronounced than the consequences of uncertainty surrounding mitigation technology availability and future energy demands and renders even the geophysical uncertainties almost irrelevant"). [Vol. 32:1 be identified in practice. 89 Satisficing is a common approach to making decisions under bounded rationality, 90 but uncertainty and ambiguity may complicate this approach by making it difficult even to assess the satisfactoriness of an option. In such a case it may be useful to use nonprobabilistic and robust decision-making approaches to developing criteria for acceptability. Using such criteria in conjunction with satisficing may be better suited to choosing climate instruments than optimization. 91 Lindblom argues that public administration and policymaking require so many compromises among parties and entail so much unavoidable uncertainty that ends and means-typically distinct in theory and analysis-become indistinguishable in practice.
92 Accordingly, we do not propose a formal process for analyzing political opportunity costs but rather a framework that may prove helpful in assessing and assembling an adequate climate policy. In keeping with the limits on quantitative assessment regarding political opportunity costs, these guidelines are qualitative and focus more on asking whether or not an instrument is "good enough," instead of whether it is superior to another.
Several aspects of political opportunity costs are easily overlooked. We examine two that are particularly important given the structure of the climate problem.
Timing of Adoption. At the outset, the initial challenge is to assess the potential effect of overcoming political barriers on the timing of adoption (i.e. the delay while political obstacles are overcome) of the instrument under consideration. Multiple measures with modest impacts can add up to a significant effect, so screening candidates to eliminate trivial options may be better than ranking all options to choose the best one. Combining screening with ranking of secondary characteristics, such as potential emissions reductions, can help prioritize the search.
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Spillover Effects. Fighting to enact a measure entails opportunity costs both in the time lost waiting for adoption and in the resources expended on advocacy. The policy fight and the policy adopted also 89 See, e.g., Simon, Rational Choice, supra note 59; Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, supra note 62. 90 Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, supra note 62, at 168. 91 See, e.g., Kunreuther et al., supra note 87, at 449 ("Formal approaches, such as the maximization of expected utility or benefit-cost analysis, are difficult to apply in the presence of ambiguity with respect to the distribution of future climate scenarios. For most issues relevant to policy choices, the solution is to use more robust approaches to risk management that do not require ambiguous probabilities."). 92 may affect the receptivity of the public and the political system to subsequent measures taken towards the same goal. Adopting one instrument could affect the chances of adopting other incremental or comprehensive instruments. If an incremental policy will undermine the likelihood of adopting a more effective policy, it may be undesirable. At the same time, the panacea bias may lead analysts to overestimate the likelihood of negative spillover effects from incremental policies. 94 Spillover effects will be difficult to assess and will resist quantification, but they should be the subject of explicit and careful debate.
Ironically, while those who focus on political feasibility often suggest emphasizing non-climate benefits to build a coalition that transcends the climate constituency, this rhetorical move may have negative spillover effects that diminish the prospects for incrementally achieving an adequate solution. Recent research suggests that public opinion on climate is largely shaped by media reports of politicians' statements on the topic. 95 If skeptical politicians continue to raise doubts about climate science, and politicians who agree with the scientific consensus substitute green jobs proposals and energy independence rhetoric for climate science discussion, the public may misinterpret the discourse, believe that climate change is not worthy of concern, and reduce support for additional measures whether incremental or comprehensive.
The consideration of political opportunity costs highlights the advantages of incremental policies. When comparing incremental climate instruments to comprehensive alternatives, several considerations are worthy of particular attention.
Complementarity. A concern about multiple policies is that they will undermine the performance of one another after their adoption. How will different measures fit together? Will feasible instruments complement or conflict with others on a similar time scale? Will the instrument complement or conflict with more comprehensive policies over the long term? Are they independent? Or are there synergies? Ostrom emphasizes that uncertainty over such interactions is precisely why we should pursue multiple measures at multiple scales of governance, in order "to learn which combined sets of actions are the most effective." Flexibility. It is likely that the agency or organization executing a particular policy will need to make repeated changes to it before perfecting its implementation. Known uncertainties and unexpected consequences require that a policy be sufficiently flexible to evolve as administrators discover its strengths and weaknesses in practice as well as its interactions with other measures. 97 Flexible policies can be adjusted iteratively to optimize their performance and to maximize their complementarity with other measures.
Monitoring. Flexibility is of little use if we do not know how well the instrument is performing. Predicting the impact and cost of new policies is subject to uncertainty, so it will be critical to monitor the policy as it is implemented. Monitoring may also be more difficult and more important for multiple incremental policy approaches than for their comprehensive counterparts. When the basket of policies comprises many different parts, uncertainties apply not only to the individual pieces but also to their interactions within the overall policy.
Finally, a collection of measures that are politically feasible in the short-term may not be adequate in the long-term to address the problem of anthropogenic climate change. In time, a more complete basket of instruments or a single more comprehensive program of emissions reductions will likely be needed. Thus, to the extent possible, short-term policymaking should enable a smooth transition to a more comprehensive and unified policy or basket of policies. One major consideration here is how to transition from an initial phase, in which the measures are coordinated only loosely or not at all, to a mature phase, in which they function in a coordinated fashion to maximize synergies and minimize interference.
98
C. Applying the Standard
How might this expanded approach look in practice? Here, we apply it to the two leading positions in the policy debates discussed abovethe comprehensive carbon pricing instruments supported by many economists and the funding of research and development ("R&D") for inexpensive clean energy proposed by Prins et al. 99 Afterward, we identify several emerging approaches that reflect the types of considerations included in the expanded standard of review. 97 general matter, support for federally funded research on energy technology has been popular for many years. The key questions for proposals that focus on clean-energy innovation concern the level of funding necessary, the time it would take a well-funded program to deliver clean energy technology, and how to shepherd the technology through the valley of death that separates successful laboratory demonstrations from marketable products. A clean-energy innovation program large enough to address climate change concerns may face even greater political opportunity costs than cap and trade or carbon taxes. 107 Support for solar and other clean-energy technology has received intense opposition, 108 which calls into question whether a sufficiently large innovation program can avoid the legislative gridlock encountered by emissions regulation bills. 109 Even if innovation is successful, Victor cautions against the "engineers' myth"-the assumption that once cheap, non-polluting energy technology becomes available, markets will quickly adopt it. 110 Thus, clean energy innovation alone seems unlikely to adequately address greenhouse gas emissions without more active government measures.
Fortunately, clean-energy innovation policies can mix well with other measures to address climate change. These policies are essential to mitigating climate change, but they cannot be its sole focus. As it is difficult to evaluate innovation programs, the history of energy technology policy is marked by exaggerated and premature declarations of triumph. 111 Revolutionary breakthroughs cannot be predicted, 112 so it would almost be impossible to determine whether a program designed to deliver such breakthroughs was on track. An energy innovation program could be compatible with a comprehensive emissions reduction program or a basket of incremental policies. Even if clean energy remained more expensive than fossil fuels, any reduction of its price would ease a transition to clean energy. In addition, as many critics of regulatory approaches have observed, it will be utterly impossible to prevent dangerous climate change unless we revolutionize clean energy technology.
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Several other approaches have emerged in recent years that reflect the types of considerations included in our expanded standard of review for climate instruments. At the domestic level, the Behavioral Wedge approach proposed by Dietz et al. seeks to reduce energy consumption by promoting non-intrusive, low cost measures at the household level. 114 The wedge comprises a collection of seventeen actions that could reduce U.S. CO 2 emissions by more than seven percent, satisfying our first criterion. 115 Policymakers in many cases can design wedge programs to avoid the political opposition that carbon pricing and restrictive regulations have encountered by relying on incentives, information, and marketing to induce voluntary action. 116 The Polycentric Governance approach advocated by Ostrom takes advantage of the heterogeneity of political feasibility at the state and local levels. Although major new climate instruments face almost insurmountable hurdles at the federal level as well as some state and local levels, meaningful measures are achievable in many states and localities. 117 The Polycentric Governance approach includes the adoption of many types of climate measures, ranging from Behavioral Wedges to carbon pricing and regulatory actions. 118 The key is that these approaches do not seek comprehensive solutions but contribute incrementally to the overall solution.
At the international level, Victor and Keohane have advocated focusing on "climate clubs" and "regime complexes," rather than waiting for comprehensive international agreements. 120 This approach likewise recognizes the opportunity costs of delay in gaining political support for a multilateral treaty that includes most, if not all, of the major emitting nations. Keohane and Victor have noted that some private organizations are addressing carbon emissions and include them in their regime complexes. 121 Similarly, several authors have argued that supply chain contracting and other private governance activities can bypass political infeasibility problems that exist at the nation-state level. 122 The approach of Chakravarty et al. also recognizes the political barriers to comprehensive climate instruments. 123 This approach does not seek to achieve all necessary emissions reductions, which would likely require including much of the global population. Instead, it argues that climate justice issues can be accounted for while still achieving large emissions reductions by focusing on achieving emissions reductions from the top billion individuals, regardless of their location around the globe. 124 
IV. CONCLUSION
Comprehensive climate approaches that will take a decade to adopt may appear preferable to immediate incremental approaches, but this is a function of the narrow standard of review, not an accurate comparison of the relative merits of the instruments. The nearly exclusive pursuit of comprehensive policies has led to insufficient focus on political opportunity costs, a subject that is outside the domain of many scholars who analyze climate instruments. The need for emissions reductions that are both large and prompt warrants a re-examination of the relative merits of incremental and comprehensive policies. We suggest a new framework for thinking about political opportunity costs and identify new policies that reflect the importance of these costs for climate change mitigation.
